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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally the Bangladesh government’s development efforts have aimed at achieving 
‘equitable economic growth.’ With this aim in view, ‘poverty alleviation objectives’--where 
social development features prominently, particularly in terms of improvements in health and 
education indicators, have always been emphasized in policy strategies. One of the most 
important recent policy document “Unlocking the Potential: National Strategy for Accelerated 
Poverty Reduction” (PRSP paper), which has been extended till June 2008, embodies such 
strategies with great importance. The PRSP paper as well as other government documents 
specifically focus on reducing incidences of poverty (also see the Medium Term Budget 
Framework 2007-2010 documents in the Ministry of Finance web site).    
 Since the return to democracy in 1991, Bangladesh’s economy has achieved a steady 
growth rate with concomitant fall of poverty incidences at an accelerated pace. In fact, the 
country experienced more than 10 percentage point fall in poverty rate in between 2000 and 
2005, which is indeed a commendable achievement (Table 1.1). This in fact is in line with the 
better performance achieved by Bangladesh in this regard over the last three decades since the 
independence. One feature of this development is, however, less assuring. Table 1.1 shows that 
the progress in terms of reductions in incidences of poverty is not taking place equally across 
Bangladesh and there are some regions where the situation has even worsened (Table 1.1). This 
might be a reflection of the fact of unequal progress in overall economic activity across regions.  
Table 1.1: Incidence of Poverty (Head Count Rate) by Cost of Basic Needs Method and by Division 
Poverty line and division 2005 2000 
   National Rural Urban National Rural Urban 
1. Using the Lower Poverty Line       
 National 25.1 28.6 14.6 34.3 37.9 20.0 
  Barisal 35.6* 37.2* 26.4* 34.7 35.9 21.7 
  Chittagong 16.1 18.7 8.1 27.5 30.1 17.1 
  Dhaka 19.9 26.1 9.6 34.5 43.6 15.8 
  Khulna 31.6 32.7 27.8* 32.3 34.0 23.0 
  Rajshahi 34.5 35.6 28.4 42.7 43.9 34.5 
  Sylhet 20.8 22.3 11.0 26.7 26.1 35.2 
2. Using the Upper Poverty Line       
 National 40.0 43.8 28.4 48.9 52.3 35.2 
  Barisal 52.0 54.1 40.4* 53.1 55.1 32.0 
  Chittagong 34.0 36.0 27.8 45.7 46.3 44.2 
  Dhaka 32.0 39.0 20.2 46.7 55.9 28.2 
  Khulna 45.7* 46.5* 43.2* 45.1 46.4 38.5 
  Rajshahi 51.2 52.3 45.2* 56.7 58.5 44.5 
  Sylhet 33.8 36.1 18.6 42.4 41.9 49.6 
*indicates that the number is higher than the corresponding number in 2000. 
Source: HIES (2005) 
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SECTION 1.1: REGIONAL ECONOMIC DISPARITY IN BANGLADESH 
Is this feature of disparate reduction of poverty across regions persistent overtime? How does the 
regions compare when viewed with other relevant indicators? 
 Figure 1.1 has been drawn with the Agricultural male wages (non-food) across 64 districts 
in a given year; here wage has been taken as a proxy variable for income for districts. Each Box 
Plot reflects the disparity in Agricultural male wages across districts for a specific year.2 
Agricultural wage is expected to embody the opportunity cost within a district determined by the 
overall economic activity in it. Therefore, higher is the level of agricultural wage greater is the 
level of economic activity and income enjoyed by a district.  
In the figure 1.1, the jump in median values between the fiscal year (FY) 1994 and 1999 
reflects the fact that nominal agricultural wage including the minimum, increased overtime. What 
is relevant to our discussion is the fact of disparity captured by the box plots here. In case of 
absolute parity a box plot collapses to a single point or level and higher is the differences in 
wages, greater would be the deviations of different levels from each other. In the FYs 2000, 2001 
and 2004 we observe the median wage to be closer to first quartile than third quartile. If we 
compare the changes in agricultural male wages between FY 2004 and FY 2001 then clearly the 
nominal wage differences of maximum and third quartile wages with the median wage have 
increased over this time period.  
Figure 1.1:  Box Plot of Agricultural Male Wages (Non-food) Across Districts for Selected Years 
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Source: FPMU, Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, GOB  
                                                
2 Available data on Agricultural Male Wage (non-food) collected by Food Policy Monitoring Unit (FPMU), Ministry 
of Food extends till 2004. 
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In Figure 1.2 nominal values of the agricultural male wages have been depicted for few 
selected districts together with their national average across time. Although few districts have 
been selectively used for the sake of exposition, including other districts do not change the story 
that one reads from figure 1.2. The observation that we make here is that the districts for which 
the agricultural male wage were below national average remained so through out the period; the 
districts that had their wages above national average also remained above for the entire time 
period shown. Therefore compared to the national averages, a number of districts have been 
particularly vibrant in terms of the labor market wage returns (e.g. Chittagong), whilst a number 
of some other districts have been lagging behind consistently during the same reference period 
(e.g. Rangpur). If the assertion that agricultural wages reflect the opportunity cost of agricultural 
activity, determined by the extent of other economic opportunities within the districts, then this 
finding is suggestive of the fact that income disparity prevails and is persistent across the districts 
or regions. 
Figure 1.2: Agricultural Male Wage Rate for Some Selected Districts (1993/94 to 2003/04) 
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Source: FPMU, Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, GOB 
In the figure 1.3, bank advances in the greater districts have been examined, as this 
variable reflects the economic activity in the districts. Figure 1.3, provides data for bank advances 
in the greater districts during the reference period of 1995-96 to 2005-06. The data provides 
consistent rankings of the greater districts in terms of the per capita total yearly bank advances, 
information as forwarded by the Bangladesh Bank and documented in the B.B.S. Yearbooks 
(Annex Table 2 provides detailed breakdown of purposes of bank advances). We could not 
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exhibit data for Dhaka, Chittagong and Khulna as they were outlier cases with rapid expansion 
trajectories all throughout the reference period.  
Figure 1.3: Per Capita Bank Advances in the Greater Districts, 1995-96 to 2005-06, Yearly Total 
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh (Various Years), B.B.S. 
Note: Dhaka, Chittagong and Khulna, not shown.  
 If one explores this issue of regional inequality further, one would find that, not only that 
it exists, but it can even be argued that this would persist for the immediate future, as some 
information would indicate. Figure 1.4 plots the per capita regional GDP in 1995-96 as against 
the annual trend growth rate of per capita regional GDP of the greater districts during 1995-96 to 
2005-06. A distinct downward-sloping line would imply that a higher per capita regional GDP in 
a particular greater district is associated with a lower annual trend growth rate of the regional per 
capita GDP in that district during the reference period, and similarly a lower per capita regional 
GDP is associated with a higher annual trend growth rate of per capita regional GDP. Therefore a 
distinct downward-sloping pattern in the scatter plot would have implied that the economically 
backward regions would “catch up” with the economically advanced regions, as time progresses. 
In Figure 1.4, a scatter plot of 19 greater districts (excluding the Chittagong Hill Tracts) fails to 
exhibit any clear-cut pattern rather than a formation of a cluster with a few outlier cases. This 
implies that data for the reference period does not provide support for the hypothesis of “regional 
convergence” in the country during the same reference period.    
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Figure 1.4: Per Capita Regional Income Convergence Across Greater Districts, 1995-96 to 2005-06 
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Source: Regional Income Data from the CPD 
SECTION 1.2: PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND REGIONAL INEQUALITY 
It can be argued that the rapid rise in government spending particularly in the areas of 
infrastructure development, health and education acted as a major force behind the progress made 
in the Bangladesh economy (the total public expenditure, which includes revenue expenditure as 
well as the ADP expenditure, has been in between 12.93 and 14.52 percents of the country’s GDP 
at current market prices in the recent years, 1995-96 to 2004-05, Annex Table 1).  
 It is commonly acknowledged that public expenditure can play a significant role in 
reducing incidences of poverty. If spent unequally public expenditure can exacerbate the existing 
imbalance in growth and poverty reduction. Therefore, it is a reasonable concern among the 
development practitioners to investigate the issue of regional distribution of public spending. It 
has been alleged that inequality in the distribution of political power has often led to some extent 
to a disproportionate public spending, which in turn may hinder prospects of poverty reduction. 
The current study aims to examine whether regional inequality issues are properly addressed and 
if not, whether the cited allegation has any factual basis 
With this aim this report examines whether government policies have somehow 
contributed to aggravating regional inequality or not. Another issue relevant to be studied is the 
motivations behind government policies, particularly issues related to the “political market” in a 
parliamentary democracy. The issues of “political market” are about “sharing arrangements of the 
public fund pie” among competing political constituencies-- a common phenomenon within a 
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democratic setup (see Atlas et al 1995 and Keefer and Khemani 2005). This study focuses on 
these issues. 
Accordingly, this report examines the declared public investments made under the Annual 
Development Program (ADP), and endeavors to answer the following question: has public 
expenditure in Bangladesh successfully addressed the regional income inequality problem and if 
not, has it been it influenced by some other considerations which are mainly political by nature? 
SECTION 1.3: RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The study examines the published ADP documents. After controlling for all the “year” and 
“greater district” effects and observed characteristics, it is hypothesized that economically better-
off regions would have a higher ADP allocation. If this line of argument were supported, this 
would imply that the ADP allocations are not properly addressing the regional inequality issue. 
An additional line of argument is that the districts with a higher proportion of constituencies 
belonging to the political party (or alliances) in power would have a tendency to receive a higher 
ADP allocation (because of alleged “bias” created in the system of ADP allocation by the culture 
of democratically elected Members of Parliaments (MPs) pursuing in favor of their own 
respective constituencies and it is also alleged that the ruling party MPs find it easier to distort the 
share of the public fund pie in their favor).  Therefore two particular points are of interest,   
Hypothesis 1: economically advanced districts receive higher ADP allocations,  
Hypothesis 2: districts with higher percentage of constituencies belonging to the party in power 
receive higher ADP allocations. 
SECTION 1.4: ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
The draft report has been organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the econometric modeling, 
methodology and data analysis issues; Section 3 analyses a number of important sectors in terms 
of pro-poor growth aspects of the economy in the ADP allocation and Section 4 concludes the 
study.
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SECTION 2: ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
The data for this study is a panel data. Since the study requires investigation of the ADP 
allocation declarations of the Government of Bangladesh over a substantial period of time, and 
distribution of this allocation among the greater districts, it automatically implies that the data 
requirement would be of a panel data type, a cross section over a time series, in this particular 
case, a series of ADP allocation lists for all the greater districts over a number of years. 
 Since the ADP data records the ADP allocations over time, we have a problem of dealing 
with the “unobserved effects”. The cause of concern with regards to the “unobserved effects” is 
that, if this “effect” is uncorrelated with each of the explanatory variables, then it can be treated 
as just another unobserved factor affecting the dependent variable in a way that is not 
systematically related to the observable explanatory variables, the principle area of interest for 
the regression analysis. On the other hand, if the “unobserved effect” is correlated with some of 
the explanatory variables, putting this “effect” in the error term would lead to serious flaws in 
estimating the regression coefficients. Hence the panel data framework provides ways to deal 
with the issue of this “unobserved effect”, and this is considered the biggest advantage of a panel 
data over either a cross section or a time series data. The crucial assumption implied in the panel 
data framework is that this “unobserved effect” is constant over time (Wooldridge 2000, 2002, 
Greene 2000). For example, in the case that the unit of observation is the “greater district”-- this 
“unobserved effect” may contain unobserved characteristics of a particular greater district, such 
as, a number of idiosyncratic features of this particular region that the researchers can not observe 
(for example, higher motivation level of the district stakeholders or higher skill levels, technical 
abilities and management structure of the local agencies, or a reputation of a particular greater 
district for successful implementation of ADP)-- these can be viewed as very close to constant 
over the period in question. In the panel data framework, there are two ways to view the 
“unobserved effects”, one is the “random effects”, and the other is the “fixed effects”. The 
“random effects” implies a zero correlation between the observed explanatory variables and the 
unobserved effect. On the other hand, the “fixed effects” allows for arbitrary correlation between 
the unobserved effect and the observed explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2002). Whether a 
fixed effects or a random effects specification is appropriate in a particular application, this 
mostly depends on results from some econometric tests, such as, the Hausman test and the 
Breusch and Pagan test.  
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 We can propose the following framework of “unobserved effects” for this analysis. This 
framework will take into account effects from one dimension, namely, in this case, the “greater 
district”. This may take a form such as:  
pcADPit  =  a 0  + a i  +  ß1 Xit  + ß2 MPit +  eit  …………………………………………………(1)  
--here, pcADPit  is the per capita ADP allocation to district i at year t 
   a0 is the intercept 
   a i is the “greater district” effect for greater district i 
   Xit are explanatory variables of the greater district i at year t   
   MP it is a set of variables designed to examine alleged political inclinations of parties in power,  
   eit  is the error term, and, 
   ß1 and ß2 are parameters to be estimated, along with fixed or random effects estimates for 
“greater districts”. We may have to depend on the abovementioned tests to decide on the issue of 
whether the “fixed effects” or “random effects” framework is an appropriate approach here.  
 According to the motivation behind this examination, both ß1 and ß2 are expected to be of 
positive signs. The argument is that, after controlling for all the unobserved effects and the “MP” 
variables, it is hypothesized that economically better-off regions would have a higher ADP 
allocation. Again the districts with a higher proportion of constituencies belonging to the political 
party or alliances in power would have a tendency to receive a higher ADP allocation, controlling 
for the income indicator, the observed and the unobserved characteristics.    
 The “unobserved effects regression” specification provides estimates for “unobserved 
effects” itself (either “random” or “fixed”). The latter will provide a particular value for a greater 
district, in such a way that the sum of all the values over all the districts is exactly zero. This 
implies that this estimate of random effects will be positive for some districts and those will be 
negative for some other districts, expressed in the form of a tendency of deviation from the 
overall national average (which is exactly placed at zero). A hypothetical district at exactly the 
national average would receive the model predicted value amount of allocation. A greater district 
with an unobserved effects estimation of positive sign implies that this district would have a 
tendency to receive higher allocations compared to the national average; similarly a greater 
district with an unobserved effects estimation of negative sign implies that this district would 
have a tendency to receive lower allocations compared to the national average (over the relevant 
time period) (Wooldridge 2000).  
 An additional point is that, this study includes the Hausman test to check the 
appropriateness of fixed effects estimation in comparison to a random effects specification. A 
non-acceptance of the null hypothesis in the Hausman test is considered to be a support for a 
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fixed effects specification (Greene 2000). On the other hand, a Breusch and Pagan test 
implemented after the random effects regression would lend support for the random effects 
specification if the null hypothesis of variance of unobserved effects being zero were rejected.  
SECTION 2.1: DATA ANALYSIS 
The source of information for ADP allocation declarations is the yearly publications of Annual 
Development Program Reports by the Planning Commission, the Government of the People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh. One feature of this data is that in a large number of cases, this data 
includes project name, initial estimated cost, expected timeframe of the project, funding sources, 
declaration of ADP allocation, etc. The projects are not listed according to the greater districts, 
which is this study’s point of interest. Therefore after classifying the projects in terms of greater 
districts, from their respective titles-- a large portion of projects could not be disaggregated in 
terms of the greater districts (also the level of disaggregation varied over time and across sectors, 
see Table 3.1.2, 3.2.2 and 3.4.2).  
 A cross-section time-series of regional income (for example, “Regional Gross Domestic 
Product”) is the most appropriate information to be used in this study. Data is not currently 
available regarding recent years’ regional GDP data since the series of information that is 
available in the official documents in this regard is up to the year 1999-2000. On the other hand, 
the Household Income and Expenditure (HIES) Surveys are of 1995-96, 2000 and 2005 (the three 
most recent ones), they were not panel series-- in addition, the HIES information is available up 
to the level of divisions, not up to the level of all the greater districts. Since the ADP declarations 
are available in the official documents up to as recent as 2007-08, it was felt that we needed as 
much updated information about regional income as possible. The Centre for Policy Dialogue 
(CPD) has provided us with a data on regional income, which turned out to be particularly useful 
in solving the data issue. The regional income data from the CPD was from 1995-96 up till the 
year 2005-06.  
 We decided not to include the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region in our regression 
analysis, since the CHT region has some political and security issues as well as a different 
topographical setting compared to all other greater districts--this requires a separate discussion. 
 One problem of data collection was that it was difficult to gather information on the 
greater districts on a yearly basis over the entire years of the data analysis section. Another 
problem was that there were statistically significant correlations among a number of variables on 
which data were available, so that they could not be included in the final regression for issues 
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with multicollinearity, such as, “road density “, “head count ratio (of poverty)”, “bank advances”, 
etc. The estimation results do not alter significantly if these alternative variables are used.  
 A large amount of district-level information on child education and health related issues 
are recorded in the “Progotir Pathey” publications by the UNICEF and the B.B.S. But these were 
not incorporated since we concentrated only on the “economic” aspects of the regional inequality 
issue, principally because of a lack of consensus among the development practitioners with 
regards to the weights to be given to the social and health indicators vis-à-vis the economic ones.            
 The results of the National Parliament Elections (1991, 1996 and 2001) are available in 
the Bangladesh Election Commission website.  
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SECTION 3: SECTORAL ANALYSES 
SECTION 3.1: RURAL DEVELOPMENT & INSTITUTIONS (RDI) 
 
The major portion of the Rural Development and Institutions (RDI) sector allocation of the ADP 
is allocated to the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED). The LGED has been 
involved in constructing rural and urban road infrastructure and networks throughout the country 
(see Table 3.1.1 for the tasks implemented by the LGED). Over the last decade, other recipient 
agencies of the RDI ADP have been the Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB), 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board (CHTDB), Local Government Division (LGD), Rural 
Development Academy, Bogra (RDA, Bogra) and others. While the overall objective is rural 
development, the recipient departments differ in terms of assignments and objectives.     
The transport sector has expanded rapidly over the last decade in government allocations 
(PER, 2003). As per documented by the PER, the LGED itself received 0.47, 0.52, 0.64 and 0.78 
percent of the respective GDPs of the years 1997-98, 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2000-01. Around 
90 percent of the total funds received by the LGED are allocated for construction, upgrading and 
rehabilitation and the remaining fund is allocated for maintenance (op. cit.), this implies that the 
major portion is allocated for construction and upgrading, and a small portion is for maintenance.      
Level of Disaggregation 
The extent of disaggregation found in the RDI ADP was higher than most other sectors reported 
in the ADP documents. Table 3.1.2 depicts the year wise disaggregation found in the published 
ADP data. The Table shows that the level of disaggregation in the fiscal year 1995-96 was about 
40% that increased to about 48% for the year 2000-01. For the year 2004-05, however, it declined 
to 27%. The average district wise disaggregation is about 35% of the total RDI ADP allocation 
(Table 3.1.2). 
Table 3.1.1: Activities by the Local Government Engineering Department , 2001-02 to 2006-07  
 
Activity 
 
Cumulative 
till 
June, 2001 
 
2001-02 
 
2002-03 
 
2003-04 
 
2004-05 
 
2005-06 
2006-07 
(till  
February, 
2007) 
Cumulative 
till 
February, 
2007 
Unpaved Road 
(Km) 
36459 4555 4770 6252 6040 6573 35 64684 
Paved Road 
(Km) 
19855 3255 3829 4804 5237 5872 3576 46428 
Bridge/Culvert 
(M.) 
288531 50882 42937 49405 60908 39728 29747 562138 
Source: LGED, from Samikkha, Ministry of Finance, GoB (2007) 
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Table 3.1.2: Disaggregation of Declared ADP Rural Development & Institutions Sector Data by 
Greater Districts, 1995-96 to 2007-08 
ADP Year Total ADP in RDI 
(in Lakh Taka) 
Total Amount of ADP 
Disaggregated by Greater 
District (in Lakh Taka) 
Percentage of 
Sectoral ADP disaggregated 
1995-96 83224 32574 39.140 
1996-97 96793 40267 41.601 
1997-98 93894 36864 39.261 
1998-99 106179 49479 46.600 
1999-00 155952 73744 47.286 
2000-01 177350 84753 47.789 
2001-02 161212 63611 39.458 
2002-03 165906 59436 35.825 
2003-04 188741 57767 30.606 
2004-05 224289 60382 26.922 
2005-06 286129 83115 29.048 
2006-07 295280 99543 33.711 
2007-08 341306 85431 25.031 
Total 2376255 826966 34.801 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
A considerable regional disparity exists in ADP allocation in the Rural Development and 
Institutions (RDI) sector in Bangladesh. Table 3.1.1 lists the ranking of different districts 
according to the amount of ADP received in this sector in a descending order. Based on the 
district wise disaggregation, among the greater districts Faridpur enjoyed the largest amount of 
cumulative ADP, Tk. 73107.5 lakh in total, from year 1995-96 through 2007-08. It is followed by 
Noakhali and Sylhet with ADP amounting to Tk. 57407 and Tk. 55,622 lakh, respectively. On the 
other hand, the two lowest ranking greater districts, Jamalpur and Tangail, received ADP 
allocations of Tk. 31993 and Tk. 31354, respectively. One important fact in this list is that one 
politically important district, namely, Faridpur, are at the top of the greater districts in terms of 
RDI ADP allocation. If we take into account the differences in population in these districts and 
express the RDI ADP allocation in terms of per capita, then still this district ranks as the third 
largest RDI ADP recipient. However, as can be seen from the last column in Table 3.1.3, 
expressing RDI ADP in terms of per capita results in a bit of reshuffle in the original ranking in 
which Patuakhali replaced Faridpur as the largest recipient, placed Kushtia few levels up and 
brings down Dhaka to a much lower rank (see Figure 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 for ADP allocations in RDI 
sector in selected greater districts, the first one is in total cumulative figures and the second one is 
in total cumulative per capita figures).  
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Estimation Procedure 
Following the model detailed in the methodology section, district level disaggregated ADP 
allocation for different years were regressed on income levels for the greater districts and proxy 
variables for political clout, named, MP ratio, and the vulnerability indicator (expressed as the  
Table 3.1.3: Ranking of Districts in terms of Rural Development & Institutions ADP (portion 
disaggregated), 1995-96 to 2007-08, declared (total, cumulative)  
Ranking District 
Adproad 
(Lakh Taka) District 
Adproadpc 
(Taka per capita) 
1 Faridpur 73107.5 Patuakhali 2259.471 
2 Noakhali 57407.33 Jamalpur 1518.808 
3 Sylhet 55622.49 Faridpur 1190.703 
4 Patuakhali 52931.86 Kushtia 1134.582 
5 Dhaka 50991.16 Noakhali 1056.972 
6 Rajshahi 50265.07 Bogra 970.7942 
7 Khulna 45768.03 Tangail 951.4348 
8 Jessore 41980.87 Pabna 801.7831 
9 Rangpur 40446.25 Khulna 784.1812 
10 Comilla 40349 Jessore 746.0113 
11 Barisal 38951.7 Dinajpur 737.7125 
12 Pabna 38484.66 Sylhet 685.801 
13 Kushtia 38478.87 Rajshahi 662.6195 
14 Bogra 37024.66 Barisal 658.6143 
15 Dinajpur 34726 Rangpur 445.4653 
16 Chittagong 33639.49 Comilla 428.0145 
17 Mymensingh 33442.66 Chittagong 377.345 
18 Jamalpur 31993.66 Mymensingh 319.4322 
19 Tangail 31354.66 Dhaka 300.2076 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
proportion of the constituencies within the greater districts won by the ruling party with a margin 
of votes less than 10 percent with the second placed candidate). District wise need for ADP 
allocation may vary due to differences in need. To address this, the district wise disaggregated 
ADP allocation (the dependent variable) has been used in per capita terms. Also the regression 
includes variables such as “population density” (persons per square kilometers) and “area” 
(square kilometers), to control for these variables.  
 The basic idea that we wanted to check in the regressions was to find out whether the 
greater district-wise ADP allocation decision is affected by political clout and income level, 
controlling for some observable variables and unobservable variables (through the panel data 
regression settings). Disparity in ADP allocation may exist due to the fact that political parties 
view it as a way out to succeed in the next election. Even if the situation is less pessimistic, the 
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disparity may be caused simply by the fact that party in power controls the flow overwhelmingly. 
The “MP ratio” and the “vulnerability” indicator have been used to take this feature into account. 
Correlation Coefficient Results  
A simple correlation coefficient was pooled across the greater districts over all the years and the 
result is provided in Table 3.1.4. The results do not exhibit much correlation among the variables 
of interest-- therefore a more rigorous analysis in the form of panel data regression was 
conducted, which controls for a large amount of variables.  
Table 3.1.4: Pearson Correlation Results  
 Per capita ADP investment allocation in a greater district 
in a year in the Rural Development & Institutions sector  
(in Taka per person) (portion disaggregated by greater 
district)  
Per capita regional GDP   
-0.032 (0.643) 
 
Percentage of constituencies 
within greater district with ruling 
party MP 
 
0.064 (0.354) 
Percentage of constituencies won 
by the ruling party within greater 
district with winning margin 
being less than 10%  
 
-0.127*(0.068) 
Source: Calculated from ADP of various years and from the Election Commission information (N=209).  
Data on regional GDP is collected from the CPD. Data on 19 greater districts from 1995-96 to 2005-06. 
(p-values of two-tailed tests of in parenthesis).   
Regression Results  
Given the general model structure shown in the methodology section of the current paper, 
additional considerations were involved in selecting specific model and estimation procedure. A 
simple pooled OLS procedure was discarded in favor of fixed or random effect estimation due to 
panel data characteristics of the dataset. 
 The sign for the natural log of per capita district GDP variable is statistically significant 
and positive. This suggests that as far the disaggregated ADP allocation in the rural development 
is concerned higher allocation went to the more advanced regions, controlling for population 
density and area as well as variables related to political influences: “mpratio” and “vulnerability”.  
Referring to Table 3.1.5, we have the random effects estimation results. The model 
significance of the random effects regression is a value of Wald chi-squared test as 90.6. The MP 
ratio and the vulnerability indicator turn out to be statistically insignificant. The random effects 
estimations for greater districts shows a tendency over the reference period, compared to the 
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national average. Patuakhali district has a tendency for the highest per capita RDI allocation of 
57.70 higher value compared to the national average. Jamalpur and Faridpur also show higher 
level of ADP investment in this sector above the national average. Barisal, Dhaka, Noakhali and 
Chittagong have the tendencies to receive low levels of RDI allocation per capita, with random 
effects estimations at -19.149, -7.744, -10.566 and -50.430, respectively, as compared to the 
national average (model predicted value is 61.316). The R-squared value (within) is 0.083, 
(between) is 0.346 and (overall) 0.18. The fraction of variance that is due to the unobserved 
greater district characteristics is estimated at 0.263. Both the Hausman test and the Breusch and 
Pagan test lend support for random effects specification for the panel regression, rather than a 
fixed effects specification.  
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Figure 3.1.1: ADP allocation in Rural Development & Institutions Sector (Portion  
Disaggregated) in Selected Districts by Year, 1995/96 to 2007/08 (in Lakh Taka) 
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Figure 3.1.2: ADP allocation in Rural Development & Institutions Sector (Portion  
Disaggregated) in Selected Districts by Year, 1995/96 to 2007/08 (in Taka per person) 
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Table 3.1.5: Random Effects Regression Results with Robust Standard Errors of the  
Rural Development and Institutions Sector (ADP Declared Allocation, 1995/96 to 2005/06) 
Dependent variable  
Per capita ADP investment allocation in a greater district in a year in the 
RDI sector (in Taka per person) 
(portion disaggregated by greater district)       
Estimated Coefficients 
(Heteroskedasticity-robust 
Standard Error) 
p-value 
Independent variables    
Natural Log of Per capita District GDP (Tk.)    52.310*** (18.424) 0.005 
Population Density (Person/Sq. Km.) – 0.051*** (0.014) 0.000 
Area (Sq. K.m.) – 0.008** (0.002) 0.001 
% of Constituencies within Greater District with Ruling Party MP  – 0.126 (0.135) 0.347 
Vulnerability Indicator of Constituencies within Greater District  0.001 (0.135) 0.996 
Constant – 333.360** (156.628) 0.033 
Estimates of Random Effects 
Dinajpur district  – 12.693 
Rangpur district  – 1.417 
Bogra district  – 2.559 
Rajshahi district  1.280  
Pabna district  – 7.835 
Kushtia district  – 19.915 
Jessore district  – 19.718 
Khulna district  – 10.367 
Barisal district  – 19.149 
Patuakhali district  57.699 
Tangail district  6.941 
Jamalpur district  32.311 
Mymensingh district 33.481 
Dhaka district  – 7.744 
Faridpur district 30.850 
Sylhet district – 7.383 
Comilla district  7.203 
Noakhali district  – 10.566 
Chittagong district  – 50.430 
Model Predicted Value(at Mean) 
Predicted Value 61.316 
Hausman test for comparison between fixed effects and random effects Chi-square= 5.91 Pr>chi-sq= 0.206  
Breusch and Pagan Test Chi-square= 46.04 Pr>chi-sq= 0.000  
Note: Number of Observations= 209;  
Model Utility: Wald Chi Sqr= 90.600 with Prob.>chi-sq= 0.000;  
R2 (within)= 0.083, (between)= 0.346, (overall)= 0.180  
correlation (u_i, Xb)= assumed zero; sigma(e)= 44.99; sigma(u)= 26.843 
and rho (fraction of variance due to u_i)= 0.263  
***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and *significant at 10% level   
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SECTION 3.2: ADP IN ROAD TRANSPORT 
Bangladesh currently has an extensive network of road transport. According to the World Bank 
website information, the total length of roads in the country is 239,226 kilometers, of which 
22,378 kilometers are classified as “main” roads (including 3,723 kilometers of National 
Highways roads), an additional 81,670 kilometers are “classified rural roads” and the remaining 
135,178 kilometers are “other rural roads”. With regards to road density, there are 2 kilometers of 
roads per 1,000 people and 1,662 kilometers of roads per 1,000 square kilometers of land (see 
Table 3.2.1 for overall national roads and highways figures). 
The importance of the road transport sub-sector has been properly recognized in the 
government policy documents (see the PRSP Draft Report, 2005). Traditionally the 
Government’s transport strategy has been to support economic development by expanding 
linkages in the internal transport system and to promote local market integration, particularly in 
the rural areas (PER, 2003, pp. 87). One success story of the road transport sub-sector is that this 
extensive rural road network system has contributed significantly to growth and poverty 
reduction by diffusing agricultural technology and raising agricultural productivity and enhancing 
economic activity (leading to higher wages and employment) and lowering transport costs-- at the 
same time, road construction had had a direct employment creation effect as a large number of 
rural roads were constructed under the Food-for-Work and other labor-intensive rural  
development initiatives. On the other hand, the road transport system has faced challenges in the 
form of low level of repair and maintenance as well as poor overall conditions, resulting from  
Table 3.2.1: Length of RHD Road Network as per road type (length in kilometers) 
Survey Year National Regional Feeder Type A Total 
1996 2862 1565 15860 20287 
1997 3144 1746 15964 20854 
1998 3090 1752 15117 20959 
1999 3086 1751 15962 20799 
2000 3086 1751 15962 20799 
2001 3086 1751 15962 20799 
2002 3086 1751 15962 20799 
2003 3086 1751 15962 20799 
2004 3086 1751 15962 20799 
2005 3529 4127 13125 20782 
2006 3529 4127 13126 20782 
Note: (a) Roads constructed and maintained by municipalities, district councils and other local 
bodies not included. (b) width of different roads by category-- national 7.32 meter, regional 5.49 
meter, and feeder type A 3.66 meter, (c) Roads and Highways Department data.  
Source: Bangladesh Statistical Yearbook, BBS (Years 2001 and 2006)  
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dependence on labor-intensive road construction technologies rather than more advanced 
engineering techniques (op. cit.).  
 Level of Disaggregation 
The ADP allocation in road transport is channeled through a number of government agencies, 
most prominently the Roads and Highways Department. The allocations in this department are 
mostly directed to expansion, and to some extent, rehabilitation, of the existing roads.  
Maintenance expenditures are generally a small portion of the ADP allocation. As with other 
sectors of the Government, this sector also exhibits small amount of disaggregating by greater 
districts. The proportion of disaggregating that was possible varied from a meager 8.2% in the 
year 1995-96 up to a high 65.04% in the year 2003-04 (Table 3.2.2) -- a total of 46% of the 
sectoral ADP was disaggregated over the reference period. Table 3.2.2 indicates that the overall 
level of disaggregating increased over the later years, particularly 2001-02 onwards. The ADP 
reports of later years have been more elaborate in stating the name of the area and nature of work, 
which turned out to be particularly useful for disaggregating.  
Table 3.2.2: Disaggregation of Declared ADP Transport (Road) Sector Data by Greater Districts  
(1995-96 to 2007-08)  
ADP Year Total ADP in Road Transport 
(in Lakh Taka) 
Total Amount of ADP 
Disaggregated by Greater 
District (in Lakh Taka) 
Percentage of 
Sectoral ADP disaggregated 
1995-96 196705 16157 8.214 
1996-97 202455 18250 9.014 
1997-98 156205 34150 21.862 
1998-99 166487 45293 27.205 
1999-00 182210 78109 42.868 
2000-01 272975 115694 42.383 
2001-02 248870 169550 68.128 
2002-03 280387 184387 65.762 
2003-04 259956 169065 65.037 
2004-05 224581 139722 62.215 
2005-06 211379 113790 53.832 
2006-07 212920 104467 49.064 
2007-08 227382 119007 52.338 
Total 2842512 1307641 46.003 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
Total and Per Capita Allocations 
The ADP allocations (only portion disaggregated) exhibit widespread fluctuations with 
regards to distribution among the greater districts (Table 3.2.3). Dhaka is the highest total 
cumulative road ADP allocation recipient over the reference period while Dinajpur is the lowest 
cumulative road ADP allocation recipient. If we take into consideration the size of the 
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population, Dhaka is replaced by Jamalpur in per capita terms. Dinajpur, Bogra, Jamalpur and 
Noakhali are the lowest road transport ADP recipient districts, both in absolute terms as well as 
in the per capita terms. The wide fluctuations of road transport ADP declarations to the greater 
districts are exhibited in Figure 3.2.1 and Figure 3.2.2, in total cumulative and per capita 
cumulative terms respectively. One interesting point is that a politically distinguishable greater 
district Bogra received very little amount in ADP road transport allocation disaggregations during 
the late 2000s, but has recovered moderately during the early 2000s.  
Table 3.2.3: Ranking of Districts in terms of Road ADP (portion disaggregated), 
1995-96 to 2007-08, declared (total, cumulative)  
Ranking District 
Adproad 
(Lakh Taka) District 
Adproadpc 
(Taka per capita) 
1 Dhaka 260149.9 Jamalpur 3020.505 
2 Rajshahi 133897 Khulna 2218.742 
3 Khulna 130508 Tangail 1790.694 
4 Sylhet 117997 Rajshahi 1745.447 
5 Comilla 76640 Pabna 1496.261 
6 Pabna 72359.5 Dhaka 1473.42 
7 Chittagong 65629.5 Kushtia 1462.687 
8 Jamalpur 63661.4 Sylhet 1458.023 
9 Tangail 59337.4 Patuakhali 1420.718 
10 Jessore 50505.67 Jessore 891.0286 
11 Kushtia 49889.67 Comilla 820.5142 
12 Rangpur 45759 Chittagong 740.8918 
13 Barisal 40357 Barisal 679.7902 
14 Patuakhali 33257 Faridpur 498.2723 
15 Faridpur 30522.9 Rangpur 492.6663 
16 Noakhali 19822 Bogra 481.4109 
17 Bogra 19131 Noakhali 365.4874 
18 Mymensingh 6667.4 Dinajpur 108.0952 
19 Dinajpur 5146.5 Mymensingh 62.89637 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 Now, referring to Figures 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, we find that, while some districts have received 
fluctuating ADP allocations, other districts, most notably, Dhaka, has always been receiving a 
substantial and yet stable ADP road allocation designated to it by name. Both per capita ADP 
figures and total ADP figures exhibited in the Figures indicate that the ADP allocations in this 
highly important sub-sector has allocated resources among different districts in a disproportionate 
manner (assuming the character of allocation does not substantially alter in the portion of ADP 
that was not disaggregated). 
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Correlation Coefficients  
Table 3.2.4 exhibits the correlation coefficient results. A simple correlation coefficient result may 
not have captured a number of factors; therefore we concentrate more on the results of the panel 
regression analysis.  
Table 3.2.4: Pearson Correlation Results  
 Per capita ADP investment allocation in a greater district 
in a year in the Road Transport sector (in Taka per person)  
(portion disaggregated by the greater districts)  
Per capita regional GDP   
0.313*** (0.000) 
 
Percentage of constituencies 
within greater district with ruling 
party MP 
 
0.270*** (0.000) 
Percentage of constituencies won 
by the ruling party within greater 
district with winning margin 
being less than 10%  
 
0.069 (0.321) 
Source: Calculated from ADP of various years and from the Election Commission information (N=209).  
Data on regional GDP is collected from the CPD. Data on 19 greater districts from 1995-96 to 2005-06. 
(p-values of two-tailed tests of in parenthesis).   
Estimation Procedure 
With regards to the regression exercise, two regression techniques were tested. One technique is 
the “fixed effects specification”. Another is the “random effects regression”, with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in place of default standard errors is aimed at reducing 
probable problems of heteroskedasticity in the regressions. With results from the abovementioned 
tests lending support for the random effects specification, this specification was followed in the 
final regression.  
Regression Results 
In the “random effects” specification, we regress the per capita greater district ADP allocation 
declarations in the road transport sector on variables such as population density, area, the 
“mpratio” and the “vulnerability” indicators, and the natural log of per capita regional income. 
The per capita district income term turns out to be positive and statistically significant, this 
implies that, after controlling for observable variables such as the population density and the area, 
and the “unobserved effects”, there has been a statistically significant coefficient estimate for the 
per capita income term. In other words, after controlling for all these effects, the ADP road 
transport allocation per capita has exhibited a tendency to be more directed towards greater 
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districts whose per capita regional income is higher. In addition to this, the “mpratio” term has 
turned out to be positive and statistically significant at 10 percent level. The estimates of 
“unobserved effects” show an overall tendency over the reference period. The estimates are in 
such a way that some of the districts are above the mean value of zero and some of the other 
districts are below the mean value such that the sum of all the “unobserved effects” reported 
would be zero. So a negative value of the unobserved effect implies a tendency for a particular 
district to receive a less than average allocation over time, similarly a positive value implies a 
tendency for more allocations to move to the district. Road ADP allocations may have a tendency 
for regional inequality, as it is evident in the wide variations in the estimates of “unobserved 
effects” across districts. At the same time, the road allocation may have been somewhat 
influenced by political considerations. In combination with the graphs exhibiting per capita road 
ADP allocations in some representative districts, there may be a systematic pattern that emerges-- 
the pattern is that a number of greater districts may not be receiving due attentions with respect to 
ADP investments in roads.  
 With regards to alleged political clouts in distribution of road ADP allocations, the model 
has a variable called the “MP ratio” (percentage of MPs within a greater district that belongs to 
the ruling party during the reference period). A second political variable that was tested was the 
“vulnerability ratio” (percentage of seats that belongs to the ruling party MPs where the election 
result had been close, such as difference between the winning MP from ruling party has won the 
parliament election with a difference of votes below 10% of the second-placed candidate)-- but 
this variable did not turn out to be statistically significant.     
 The random effects results have provided both expected and statistically significant signs 
for the natural log of per capita regional GDP and mpratio. The coefficient of the log of per 
capita district GDP term is 124.741 (standard error is 21.866). Here the natural log of per capita 
regional GDP has been used rather than the simple per capita regional GDP to reduce fluctuations 
in the money figures. One explanation for the statistical significance of natural log of per capita 
regional GDP is that the economically advanced regions are often given higher allocation 
declarations, controlling for some observable variables and unobserved effects; simply stating, 
roads and bridges are typically assigned not in the remotest of places, but typically these are built 
in better off regions. A statistical significance for the “mpratio” variable can be interpreted as 
follows-- the Members of Parliaments may have played a more prominent role in this road 
transport sector. A road or a bridge constructed with active “influences” by the incumbent MP is 
considered to be one of the key factors for the MP to be able to retain the constituency in the next 
election. The local MP is therefore much more concerned about a road or a bridge, principally 
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because this is a winning point in the next election, and at the same time, given a typically large 
size of this road allocation, it is much more convenient for the MP to get involved in some rent-
seeking or favoritism activities; this is actually more easier if the MP is from the ruling party or 
the alliance in power.   
Figure 3.2.1: ADP allocation in Road Transport (Only Portion Disaggregated) in Selected Districts 
by year, 1995/96 to 2007/08 (in Lakh Taka) 
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Source: Authors’ Calculation 
Figure 3.2.2: Per capita ADP allocation in Road Transport (Only Portion Disaggregated) in Selected 
Districts by year, 1995/96 to 2007/08 (in Taka per person)  
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Table 3.2.5: Random Effects Regression Results with Robust Standard Errors of the Road 
Transport Sector (ADP Declared Allocation, 1995/96 to 2005/06)  
Dependent variable  
Per capita ADP investment allocation in a greater district in a year in the 
Road Transport sector (in Taka per person) 
(portion disaggregated by greater district)       
Estimated Coefficients 
(Heteroskedasticity-robust 
Standard Error) 
p-value 
Independent variables    
Natural Log of Per capita District GDP (Tk.)    124.741***(21.866)  0.000 
Population Density (Person/Sq. Km.) – 0.006 (0.017) 0.746 
Area (Sq. Km.) – 0.002 (0.005) 0.644 
% of Constituencies within Greater District with Ruling Party MP  0.317*(0.187) 0.090 
Vulnerability Indicator of Constituencies within Greater District  0.011 (0.353) 0.976 
Constant – 1136.127***(197.475) 0.000 
Estimates of Random Effects 
Dinajpur district  – 58.517 
Rangpur district  – 4.238 
Bogra district  – 46.545 
Rajshahi district  72.582 
Pabna district  30.186 
Kushtia district  40.560 
Jessore district  – 9.082 
Khulna district  72.644 
Barisal district  – 29.368 
Patuakhali district  23.202 
Tangail district  79.721 
Jamalpur district  – 41.998 
Mymensingh district – 10.116 
Dhaka district  – 31.299 
Faridpur district – 7.926 
Sylhet district 30.239 
Comilla district  5.511 
Noakhali district  – 34.313 
Chittagong district  – 81.244 
Model Predicted Value(at Mean) 
Predicted Value 78.036 
Hausman test for comparison between fixed effects and random effects Chi-square= 4.82 Pr>chi-sq= 0.306  
Breusch and Pagan Test Chi-square= 60.07 Pr>chi-sq= 0.000  
Note: Number of Observations= 209;  
Model Utility: Wald Chi Sqr= 92.92 with Prob.>chi-sq= 0.000;  
R2 (within)= 0.195, (between)= 0.067, (overall)= 0.144  
Correlation (u_i, Xb)= assumed zero; sigma(e)= 79.105; sigma(u)=50.286   
and rho (fraction of variance due to u_i)= 0.288 
***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and *significant at 10% level   
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SECTION 3.3: HEALTH, POPULATION AND FAMILY WELFARE 
Bangladesh has made substantial progress in the provision of Health care facilities over the years. 
Bangladesh Public Expenditure Review (2003) reports that considerable improvement came 
through investment in this sector-- infant mortality rate has declined, life expectancy has increase 
by 14 years and spread of preventable diseases, such as polio and malaria, has been contained. 
Many more challenges remain still; much less progress came in reducing malnutrition of children 
and maternal mortality has remained very high.  
 The sector was included in the current study as this sector ranks high in terms of 
proportion of allocation in ADP. However, after disaggregation at this sector was found to be 
very insignificant, particularly for the years 1998 onward. Figure 3.31 depicts year wise 
disaggregation found in this sector for different districts. It can be seen from the graph that 
starting from the fiscal year 1998-99 the level of disaggregation dramatically declined below 1% 
and has remained below 10% for recent years. The reason behind such decline had to do with 
government’s decision to shift to a programmatic approach from the previous project based 
approach. Due to such low level of disaggregation no meaningful regression or analysis can be 
conducted on the basis of the disaggregated data. 
Figure 3.3.1: Level of Disaggregation in the Health ADP Allocation, 1995/96 to 2007/08 
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 Although no direct analysis could be conducted on the basis of data, due to idiosyncrasy 
of this sector there are reasons to believe that public spending overtime had been regionally 
equitable in nature. As have been mentioned in the above, Bangladesh has been successful in 
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containing many preventable diseases. Success in prevention in such cases would require equity 
in spending; as otherwise constant migration would compromise success in any region. 
 The government has initiated a shift in the Health, Population and Family Welfare sector 
from 1998 in which project based approach has been replaced with programmatic approach. The 
Health and Population Sector Program (HPSP) aims at making changes which are Bangladesh 
wide and therefore requires investment equitably at least at the Thana levels. However, if or not 
equitable distribution in spending was achieved in reality can only be found through primary data 
collection from the field level studies. 
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SECTION 3.4: EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 
Bangladesh’s achievement in the education sector is quite impressive compared to other least 
developed countries and particularly compared to her neighbours. Government’s strong 
commitment to education, manifested in the fact that this sector is receiving the highest share of 
the public expenditure (ADP and recurrent budgets combined) for quite a number of years now, 
has made this possible. 
Table 3.4.1: Bangladesh Public Education Expenditure 
Fiscal Year Revenue Expenditure 
(percent of GDP) 
Development Expenditure  
(percent of GDP) 
1995-96 1.30 0.83 
1996-97 1.30 n.a. 
1997-98 1.39 0.73 
1998-99 1.35 0.80 
1999-00 1.37 0.84 
Source: Bangladesh Public Expenditure Review (2003) 
n.a. not available 
 
 However, not all the regions of the country have witnessed similar success in education. 
Though all regions have seen some progress, but there is still wide variation across regions in 
terms of the key indicators of education and the gap is not narrowing. Under this context one may 
try to analyze the distribution of public investment across regions to see whether government 
expenditure decision has anything to do with it.  
Level of Disaggregation 
Unfortunately, in the Annual Development Program, the regional investment figures are not 
readily available. So the study team had to engage in identifying the funds directed towards each  
region based on the name of the project. This allowed regional disaggregation of only a very  
small portion of the total investment (Table 3.4.2). 
Total and Per Capita Allocations 
Analysis of the disaggregated data reveals that there exist significant differences in the public 
investment in Education and Religious Affairs across regions (Table 3.4.3). It may happen due to 
the fact that these regions vary in terms of size of the population. However, the variation does not 
go away when one looks into per capita public investment in this sector. In fact the rankings are 
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almost similar indicating that regions that dominate in receiving public investment also do so in 
per capita sense.  
A look into the investment flows over time reveals that Dhaka always gets the major share 
of the public investment (Figure 3.4.1). This also holds true till 2004 when per capita investment 
flows are considered (Figure 3.4.2). After 2005 Sylhet, Mymensingh and Khulna received more 
public investment per person than Dhaka and other regions.  
Now if one considers per capita regional gross domestic product as a measure of regional 
prosperity, and if the data reveals that per capita ADP spending is associated with this variable, 
then it may happen that the variation in public investment across regions is partly explained by  
regional inequality. Strength and vulnerability of the ruling party in a particular region might also 
play a role. 
Table 3.4.2: Disaggregation of Declared ADP Education and Religious Affairs Sector Data by    
Greater Districts, 1995-96 to 2007-08   
ADP Year Total ADP in Education 
(in Lakh Taka) 
Total Amount of ADP 
Disaggregated by Greater 
District (in Lakh Taka) 
Percentage of 
Sectoral ADP disaggregated 
1995-96 159648 10393 6.510 
1996-97 175822 14962 8.510 
1997-98 167711 13205 7.874 
1998-99 170290 14368 8.437 
1999-00 192411 11767 6.116 
2000-01 224500 14529 6.472 
2001-02 238673 15678 6.569 
2002-03 289450 17698 6.114 
2003-04 234364 19270 8.222 
2004-05 302225 19065 6.308 
2005-06 278222 34828 12.518 
2006-07 752291 31700 4.214 
2007-08 359317 29855 8.309 
Total 3544924 247318 6.977 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
Table 3.4.3: Ranking of Greater Districts (Receiving Significant Investments) in terms of Education 
ADP (Portion Disaggregated), 1995-96 to 2007-08, Declared (Total, Cumulative)  
Ranking District 
ADP 
(Lakh Taka) District 
ADPPC 
(Taka per capita) 
1 Dhaka 131406 Dhaka 763.17 
2 Sylhet 21866 Sylhet 266.54 
3 Rajshahi 17135 Khulna 225.75 
4 Khulna 13416 Kushtia 225.12 
5 Chittagong 13330 Rajshahi 220.46 
6 Mymensingh 12136 Chittagong 156.13 
7 Kushtia 7326 Mymensingh 115.03 
8 Noakhali 5147 Noakhali 95.63 
9 Comilla 4739 Barisal 73.58 
10 Barisal 4386 Bogra 69.88 
11 Faridpur 3961 Jessore 63.56 
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Ranking District 
ADP 
(Lakh Taka) District 
ADPPC 
(Taka per capita) 
12 Jessore 3754 Faridpur 62.79 
13 Bogra 2788 Comilla 49.49 
14 Dinajpur 1402 Dinajpur 28.03 
15 Pabna 745 Pabna 14.37 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
Figure 3.4.1: ADP Expenditure in Education and Religious Affairs in Selected Regions 
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Figure 3.4.2: Per Capita ADP Expenditure in Education and Religious Affairs  in Selected Regions 
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Correlation Coefficients 
The results (Table 3.4.4) do indicate that the association between per capita ADP spending in this 
sector and per capita regional gross domestic product is moderate and positive and it is significant 
as well. The association between per capita ADP spending with percentage of constituencies in a 
region won by ruling party turns out to be very small and positive but this association is not 
significant. Vulnerability of the ruling party measured as percentage of seats won by the ruling 
party in a region where the victory margin is less than 10%, does not have any association with 
per capita ADP spending. 
Table 3.4.4: Pearson Correlation Results 
 Per capita ADP investment allocation in a greater district 
in a year in the education and religious affairs sector 
(portion disaggregated by greater district) 
Per capita regional GDP  
0.684*** (0.000) 
 
Percentage of constituencies 
within greater district with ruling 
party MP 
 
0.112 (0.106) 
Percentage of constituencies won 
by the ruling party within greater 
district with winning margin 
being less than 10%  
 
-0.032 (0.647) 
Source: Calculated from ADP of various years, and from election commission reports (N=209).  
Data on ADP allocation from 1995-96 to 2005-06.  
(p-values of two-tailed test in parenthesis) 
Estimation Procedure 
As per the methodology, regression of the regional variation in per capita ADP investment on the 
per capita regional GDP, population density, area of the greater district, percentage of 
constituencies within greater district with ruling party MP, and the “vulnerability indicator” 
(percentage of the constituencies within the greater district won by the ruling party but by a 
margin of votes less than ten percent) was carried out. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors were used. Random effects specification was selected instead of fixed effects specification. 
Regression Results 
The results indicate that the pool of independent variables do explain the variation in the 
dependent variable (Table 3.4.5). The constant term and the coefficients of the vulnerability 
indicator of constituencies with the region and natural log of per capita district GDP turn out to 
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be significant at 1% level and the coefficients of population density and area are significant at 5% 
level. The sign of the coefficient of per capita GDP is positive which indicate that regions with 
higher level of per capita GDP tend to receive more public investment per person. The negative 
relationship as seen from the result between the dependent variable and the vulnerability indicator 
is not expected and as seen the coefficient is not economically significant. Dhaka and Kushtia are 
the two regions that receive significantly more public investment than the average and for 
Rangpur it is just the opposite. However, one has to be very cautious in interpreting these results 
as the analysis is carried out using a very small percent of the total spending and the estimation 
may suffer from omitted variable bias. 
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Table 3.4.5: Random Effects Regression Results with Robust Standard Errors of the  
Education and Religious Affairs Sector (ADP Declared Allocation, 1995/96 to 2005/06)  
Dependent variable  
Per capita ADP investment allocation in a greater district in a year in the 
Education and Religious Affairs sector (in Taka per person) 
(portion disaggregated by greater district)       
Estimated Coefficients 
(Heteroskedasticity-robust 
Standard Error) 
p-value 
Independent variables    
Natural Log of Per capita District GDP (Tk.)    13.145***(3.741) 0.000 
Population Density (Person/Sq. Km.) 0.008**(0.004) 0.029 
Area (Sq. Km.) 0.002*(0.001) 0.046 
% of Constituencies within Greater District with Ruling Party MP  – 0.008 (0.024) 0.751 
Vulnerability Indicator of Constituencies within Greater District  – 0.091*** (0.029) 0.002 
Constant – 140.417*** (34.918) 0.000 
Estimates of Random Effects 
Dinajpur district  – 4.389 
Rangpur district  – 11.120 
Bogra district  1.230 
Rajshahi district  6.732 
Pabna district  – 4.023 
Kushtia district  17.835 
Jessore district  – 7.483 
Khulna district  1.789 
Barisal district  – 0.588 
Patuakhali district  – 6.071 
Tangail district  – 0.065 
Jamalpur district  – 1.422 
Mymensingh district – 7.016 
Dhaka district  27.193 
Faridpur district – 3.624 
Sylhet district 2.858 
Comilla district  – 12.641 
Noakhali district  4.714 
Chittagong district  – 3.830 
Model Predicted Value(at Mean) 
Predicted Value 8.535 
Hausman test for comparison between fixed effects and random effects Chi-square= 3.02  Pr>chi-sq= 0.554  
Breusch and Pagan Test Chi-square= 195.100 Pr>chi-sq= 0.000  
Note: Number of Observations= 209;  
Model Utility: Wald Chi Sqr= 28.65 with Prob.>chi-sq= 0.000;  
R2 (within)= 0.135, (between)=0.477, (overall)= 0.362  
correlation (u_i, Xb)= assumed zero; sigma(e)= 9.091; sigma(u)= 8.965  
and rho (fraction of variance due to u_i)= 0.507 
***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and *significant at 10% level   
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SECTION 4: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The following are the concluding points for this study.  
(1) The share of ADP investment figures that can be disaggregated by regions turns out to 
be on the lower side and in some instances very low for the sectors considered. Actually, this task 
is quite challenging given the nature of the public documents, which are not user friendly. The 
citizens of the country requires better access to information regarding public expenditure 
allocation to be able to better understand the functioning of the government and its contribution 
to their economic well-being.  
(2) The study requires further investigation into the issue at hand. It seems that one needs 
go to different ministries, go through their year-to-year project documents that were included in 
the ADP and then come up with a better data set. But this requires a more extensive data 
collection phase, which the present study could not do.  
(3) The limited data set does indicate that these investment numbers are substantially high 
for Dhaka. However, once adjusted for population, the difference becomes moderate in all the 
sectors. This may imply that public expenditure allocation in Bangladesh has some in-built 
regional inequality features that, if not addressed properly, may have adverse consequences for 
the homogenous development of the country in the long run. 
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Annex
 1 
Annex Table 1. Public Expenditure in Bangladesh (1995-96 to 2005-06) (in Million Taka) (Revised Estimates) 
Year 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 
Development Expenditure  100157 110410 110370 125090 154710 161508 140902 154343 168173 187260 194720 
Revenue Expenditure 120833 123731 148450 168783 185820 206619 220002 265881 274322 327736 351544 
GDP at current market prices 1663240 1807013 2001766 2196952 2370856 2535464 2732010 3005801 3329731 3707070 4157279 
Dev. Exp. as % of GDP current market prices  6.022 6.11 5.514 5.694 6.525 6.37 5.157 5.135 5.051 5.051 4.684 
Rev. Exp. as % of GDP current market prices 7.264 6.847 7.416 7.683 7.838 8.149 8.053 8.846 8.239 8.841 8.4564 
Public Expenditure as % of GDP 13.287 12.957 12.93 13.377 14.363 14.519 13.21 13.981 13.289 13.892 13.14 
Population at mid financial year (million) 122.1 124.3 126.5 128.2 129.8 129.9 131.6 133.4 135.2 137 n.a. 
Per capita Total Expenditure              
at constant prices (base: 1995-96) (in Tk.) 893 1827 1885 2018 2268 2411 2261 2485 2477 2707 n.a. 
at current prices (in Tk.) 1810 1884 2046 2292 2623 2834 2742 3150 3273 3759 n.a. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh (Various Years), B.B.S.  
n.a. not available 
 
 2 
 
Annex Table 2. Bank Advances by Main Economic Purposes (1995-96 to 2005-06) (in Million Taka)  
Economic Purpose 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 
Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry 64337.8 67399.3 69904.6 80378.6 86749.0 93147.7 96458.1 93401.1 98435.7 106746.4 113529.2 
Industry (Other than Working Capital Financing) 97126.9 111738.8 141409.4 153524.2 168945.0 182454.0 180887.2 168951.5 183792.6 199521.9 244756.1 
Working Capital Financing 39127.6 49486.2 50900.8 58036.9 51985.3 62088.3 98008.6 149718.9 174960.3 220689.1 257989.6 
Construction 20491.5 24241.2 26214.0 31841.3 34064.6 39189.5 45725.5 56373.9 64262.8 74562.1 86684.7 
Electricity, Gas, Water and Sanitary Services 1021.6 129.9 162.6 106.8 196.8 35.1 131.6 74.9 20.1 56.1 34.8 
Transport & Communication  5271.3 6613.6 9457.3 7621.3 8172.8 9896.0 12653.8 12753.0 11646.2 13837.0 19595.2 
Storage 4351.5 5243.2 7535.6 8481.4 9091.5 9872.1 9897.1 8691.8 8438.1 7493.0 9193.3 
Trade  111141.9 120953.2 130003.5 146930.4 172240.4 203611.3 236070.2 278667.0 320261.0 394935.8 437604.4 
Miscellaneous 28790.3 31940.2 41309.4 52914.9 62172.0 87486.1 87891.5 78709.0 89485.7 99180.0 122265.7 
Total 371660.4 417645.6 479897.2 539835.8 593617.4 687780.1 767723.6 847341.1 951302.5 1117321.9 1291653.0 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh (Various Years), B.B.S. 
